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Abstract 
This paper presents an unusual inter-governmental financial arrangement: a payment by 
constituent units of a federation to the federal government to keep it out of a fiscal field and thus 
gain sole occupancy for themselves. This paper thus presents the history of the federal/provincial 
relationship in the gaming field in Canada focusing on the key period of 1976-1980 when both 
levels of governments operated lotteries. It chronicles the attempts of both levels of governments 
to reach an agreement on their sharing of this revenue field. Revenue sharing was rejected, 
market slicing was agreed to but since 1980, the provinces have purchased a sole occupancy right 
through an annual payment to the federal government. It shows, using multivariate analysis, that 
the presence of Loto-Canada reduced provincial gaming revenues in 1978 and 1979 and thus that 
the provinces were right to seek sole occupancy of the lottery field. It also shows, using 
numerical simulations of alternative formulas, that the agreement negotiated is very advantageous 
for the provinces as it did not take into account either the future growth of the lottery market or 
the diversification of the gaming market in Canada from 1980 to 2010, let alone both.  
 
Key words: Lottery, Gaming revenues, fiscal federalism, Canada  
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Introduction 
Canadian financial federal-provincial relations are characterized by various tax sharing 
agreements, federal per capita transfers, federally funded equalization payments and 
numerous federal-provincial cost-sharing agreements (Bird and Vaillancourt, 2007). All of 
these features are found in other federations in the world. However, the federal-provincial 
financial arrangements in the field of gaming appear to be unique to Canada. The provinces 
as a group pay the federal government who in return leaves the gaming field to the 
provincial tax monopolies, not introducing a national lottery. The purpose of this paper is to 
document and analyze this set of arrangements. This paper is divided in three parts: first, 
we present the history of the federal/provincial relationship in the gaming field with special 
attention to the birth and death (at the tender age of four) of the federal Loto-Canada, as 
well as the attempts to reach agreements with the provinces regarding the presence of the 
federal government as implemented by its lottery agency in the gaming field. Second, we 
present an estimation of the impact of Loto-Canada’s presence on provincial gaming net 
revenues and ticket sales. Third, we simulate the federal revenues for the 1980-2010 period 
under alternative revenue sharing agreements and compare them to effective revenues.  
 
1. History of the Canadian federal/provincial relationship in the gaming 
fiscal field 
 
Gaming was legalized in Canada with an amendment to the criminal code1 in 1969. This was 
partly due to the introduction in 1968 by the city of Montréal of a voluntary tax that 
allowed ‘taxpayers’ to win a prize and also to changing mores with respect to gaming which 
were increasing the demand for gaming , including illegal lotteries2. The province of Québec 
was the first to enter the lottery market in 1970 with its own lottery corporation, Loto-
Québec3. Ontario followed in 1975 with the Ontario Lottery Corporation, followed shortly 
                                                 
1
 In Canada, the criminal code is federal and applies in all provinces  
2
 Of which the most common was the Irish sweepstakes  
3
 The Montreal voluntary tax was thus replaced de facto by a provincial lottery. This is similar to what happened in 
the mid-sixties when the introduction of a provincial sales tax was accompanied  with the demise of municipal and 
school board sales taxes  
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after in 1976 by two four-province lottery bodies: the Atlantic Lottery Corporation4 and the 
Western Lottery Corporation5.  An Olympic lottery was put in place in 1973 by the federal 
government to help finance the Montreal 1976 Olympic Games6. The Olympic lottery sold 
$10 tickets with a $1 million prize7. Loto-Canada was created in September 1976 by the 
federal government as a successor to the Olympic Lottery. Thus a permanent federal lottery 
was created once the ten provinces had already introduced provincial lotteries.8 While the 
Olympic lottery was originally the only one offering a $1 million prize (for a $10 ticket), by 
1976 both the Ontario and Western Lottery corporations were offering an equivalent $1 
million prize for tickets sold for $5. The sales of $10 tickets subsequently plunged; thus 
Loto-Canada was forced to introduce new products to maintain its revenues in order to 
meet the federal commitment to help finance the Olympic Games deficit until 1979.  
 
Throughout the 1976-1979 period, discussions took place between the federal government 
and the provinces concerning the sharing of the lottery field and thus revenues between the 
two levels of government after 1979. No progress had been made in the discussions 
between the federal and provincial governments when Loto-Canada decided to proceed 
with the implementation of a new product, Loto Select9, in 1978.   
 
In 1978 federal-provincial discussions on revenue–sharing and federal transfers such as 
equalisation and block grants (Established program financing) were ongoing. The federal 
proposals included for the first time the sharing of federal lottery revenues. The approach 
suggested was the sharing of revenues according to the respective financial involvement of 
each level of government in the fields traditionally funded by lottery revenues, such as 
amateur sports. This would have meant that provincial governments would receive 50% of 
the net revenues of the federal lottery (in addition to the revenues from their own 
                                                 
4
 Made up of Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island ,Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 
5
 Made up of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia 
6
  It raised money mainly for the Olympics but also for amateur sports  
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/lottery  
7
 Cousineau, Guy. Report on Loto Select, 1979, p. 2 
8
 With 12.5 percent of its profits distributed to the provincial governments; the allocation key was the share of tickets 
sold in each province. 
9
 As implied by its name, Loto Select would allow purchasers to choose the combination of numbers on their ticket. 
This was an innovative concept then.  
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lotteries)10. The provinces demanded the withdrawal of the federal government from the 
lottery field, stating they had no interest in such revenue-sharing. Therefore, this revenue 
sharing arrangement was not implemented. However, later in 1978 a new agreement was 
reached, providing that provinces would have the exclusive rights to games with a ticket 
price of $9 or less, whereas the federal government would solely occupy the market of 
games with a ticket price of $10 and above. This was already the practice since 1976 of the 
provincial and federal lotteries. Such an approach replaced revenue-sharing by market-
slicing. Both federal and provincial governments were satisfied with the elimination of 
direct price competition: this fulfilled the desire for cooperation sought by the former, and 
the desire for exclusivity in a specific market by the latter. The grounds were thus laid for a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Lotteries between the federal government and the 
provinces11. However, important aspects of that agreement remained to be negotiated.  
 
“This accord was contingent, however, on a commitment by the Ontario and 
Quebec lottery corporations to settle Loto-Canada’s obligations in the lotto 
game (Loto-Select). This settlement proved to be more difficult than anticipated 
as the problem of integrating two different game systems became apparent. 
This realization tended to invalidate the previous understanding that one way 
to settle the Corporation’s contract would be for the provincial lotteries simply 
to take over those portions of the system which were ready for delivery. It 
became clear that the best resolution could be a monetary settlement. This, 
however, meant further negotiations and a further period of uncertainty.”12 
 
The agreement was thus never put in place.  During this period, the preparation by Loto-
Canada for the implementation of Loto Select continued with a planned introduction date in 
November 1978.  
 
Further federal-provincial negotiations led to the signature of a new Memorandum in 
October 1978, thus triggering the cancellation of Loto Select. The main features of this 1978 
agreement are summarized in Appendix A- 1. The abolition of Loto Select set the table for 
further cooperation between the federal government and the provinces.  The payment by 
                                                 
10
 Cousineau, Guy, Report on Loto Select, 1979, p. 9 
11
 Except Nova Scotia 
12
 Cousineau, Guy, Report on Loto Select, 1979, p. 10 
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the provinces of the termination costs of Loto Select could be seen as an investment leading 
to higher profits to be generated by an ongoing and unchallenged monopoly in a share of 
the lottery market.  
 
In late 1978 and early 1979, Loto-Québec introduced its real time bet acceptation system, 
thus creating the instant lotteries field. Additionally, Ontario, Québec and the Western 
provinces jointly created the Interprovincial Lottery Corporation; the Atlantic Provinces 
joined a few months later. For the same ticket price, this consolidated market allowed more 
tickets to be sold and more grand prizes to be drawn, each draw offering ten one million 
dollar prizes. Loto-Canada attempted to counter these moves but this resulted in an 
increase in its expenses and a fall both in net revenues and ticket sales. These actions were 
disavowed by the federal Progressive Conservative party, then in opposition, which 
promised in its electoral program the dismantling of Loto-Canada. After coming to power 
following the February 1979 election, it carried out this promise.  
 
The federal/provincial lottery agreement was signed in August 1979. The federal 
government granted the provinces a monopoly on lotteries in exchange for yearly payments 
of $24 million from the provincial lottery corporations. These payments took the form of 
quarterly instalments of $6 million beginning on April 1st 1980. They were to increase 
according to inflation using the Consumer Price Index as a measure. Every lottery 
corporation was to contribute to this payment proportionately to the revenues it gained as 
a percentage of the total Canadian revenues from lotteries.  
 
In 1981, the federal government passed the Athletic contests and Events pool act which 
allowed the creation of the Canadian Sports pool corp. The provinces considered that this 
contravened the 1979 agreement. After discussions, the federal government did not 
implement a lottery to help finance the Calgary Olympic Games. In exchange, the provinces 
agreed to pay the federal government an extra $100 million over three years to help finance 
that event. Thereafter, the criminal code was amended in December 1985 and the provision 
allowing the federal government to conduct lotteries was removed; the lottery fiscal field 
was now strictly reserved to the provinces.  
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2. The impact of the presence of Loto-Canada in the lottery field on the 
provincial gaming revenues: empirical results 
 
The provinces were willing to pay the federal government to have it withdraw from the 
lottery field. But where they right to be concerned? Did Loto-Canada reduce the sales and 
more importantly the net revenues of provincial lotteries? Table 1 presents data on the 
sales of provincial and federal lotteries for the 1970-1980 period when provincial lotteries 
were introduced and the federal lottery existed.   
 
 It shows that the size of the Canadian lottery market increased twenty fold from 1970 to 
1980 and almost doubled from 1975 to 1976, with the creation of Loto-Canada, as well as 
the Atlantic and Western Lottery Corporations. This growth was also considerable from 
1976 to 1977.  Loto-Canada accounted for almost 30% of the lottery sales in 1977 and 
1978; its introduction was accompanied by the second largest year over year growth in 
provincial lottery sales in the 1970-1980 period while its demise in 1979 was associated 
with the strongest year over year growth in overall sales in the 1976/1977 to 1979/1980 
years. Hence, looking at these numbers, one cannot easily answer the question posed above. 
To correctly assess the impact of Loto-Canada on the provincial lotteries, we therefore carry 
out a multivariate analysis.     
 
Table 1: Ticket sales and ticket sales growth (year over year) by Lottery Corporation 
and total, 1970-1980 
 
Source: Roy and Vaillancourt (2000) and calculations by the authors. 
__________________________________________ 
Ticket 
sales (M$)
Growth 
(%)
Ticket 
sales (M$)
Growth 
(%)
Ticket 
sales (M$)
Growth 
(%)
Ticket 
sales (M$)
Growth 
(%)
Ticket 
sales (M$)
Growth 
(%)
Ticket sales 
(M$)
Growth 
(%)
1970 51 436 51 436 
1971 60 495 18 60 495 18 
1972 97 164 61 97 164 61 
1973 125 510 29 125 510 29 
1974 132 185 5 132 185 5 
1975 147 892 12 97 137 245 029 85 
1976 11 574 183 343 24 218 792 125 30 104 107 182 443 813 81 
1977 40 602 251 202 899 11 240 431 10 71 273 137 225 214 110 555 205 25 
1978 43 617 7 244 122 20 235 106 -2 129 826 82 258 907 15 652 671 18 
1979 41 096 -6 318 686 31 323 787 38 156 305 20 134 226 -48 839 874 29 
1980 52 557 28 410 554 29 490 333 51 200 225 28 1 153 669 37 
Loto-Canada Provincial total
Atlantic Lottery 
Corporation Loto-Québec
Ontario Lottery 
Corporation
Western Lottery 
Corporation
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A literature review (Mikesell and Zorn 1987; Mikesell, 1988; Tosun and Skidmore, 2004) 
allowed us to identify key variables determining lottery revenues and sales over time. Two 
important variables are average personal income and the unemployment rate: an increase 
in both should have a positive impact on sales and thus revenues13.   
 
Another variable is the availability of substitutes for lotteries measured here by the annual 
net benefits obtained by provinces from casinos and video lottery terminals (zero before 
1990); it should reduce lottery sales and thus provincial gaming revenues14. Finally we use 
four annual dichotomous variables to account for the presence or not of Loto-Canada. To 
take into account the underlying demographic and taste differences between provinces we 
include dichotomous variables for each (no constant term). The regression results are 
found in Appendix A-2 where various econometric issues are also discussed.  
 
The existence of Loto-Canada has an uncertain impact on provincial lottery sales and more 
importantly revenues. On one hand, Loto-Canada may grab market shares from the 
provincial lottery corporations, reducing their sales and revenues. On the other, its 
promotion of lotteries may increase the overall lottery market and consequently revenues 
for all suppliers. Our results indicate that the impact of Loto-Canada on provincial lottery 
sales and benefits was negative for 1978 and 1979. In 1978, the presence of Loto-Canada 
reduced per capita net benefits growth by $5.8 and in 1979 by a comparable $5.5. Thus the 
provinces gained from removing a competitor. Given Canada’s population then, and in the 
absence of Loto-Canada, provincial revenues would have grown by about $150-175 M more 
in both years. One may be surprised that we find no such impact for 1976 or 1977. But 
recall that the Western Lottery Corporation and the Atlantic Lottery Corporation were both 
created during the first two years in which Loto-Canada was in operation. As shown in table 
1, this was an unsettled gaming market where multiple factors such as new suppliers of 
lotteries interacted.  
                                                 
13
During recessions when unemployment increases, individuals find buying lottery tickets more attractive due to the 
greater marginal utility of expected lottery winnings.  
14
 There is little inter-provincial sales of  lotteries in Canada ;thus this is not accounted for 
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Thus the payment of $24M agreed to in 1979 is less than 20% of the 150-175 $M amount 
noted above. While one must be careful in comparing a legally set amount to be paid in 
perpetuity (in real terms) and one obtained from multivariate analysis, it seems quite 
plausible that the provinces were right from a revenue perspective to purchase exclusivity 
in the lottery field. 
 
3. Evaluating the 1979 agreement: a financial perspective  
 
The preceding analysis shows that provinces were right to buy out the federal government 
from the lottery field. But did they pay too little or too much? Or reciprocally, did the federal 
government receive too little or too much? One can answer these questions by examining 
alternative scenarios given the subsequent evolution of the lottery market and the gaming 
market as a whole. 
 
The federal/provincial 1979 lottery agreement takes into account only lotteries, which 
were at the time the only form of legal gaming in Canada. Following the  growth that occurs 
as of 1990 in the casino and video lottery terminals (VLT) field, the proportion of lottery 
revenues  in total provincial gaming revenues has shrunk from 100% to 34% in 2010 (see 
figure 1). Thus, the provincial payments to the federal government, which represented 3 
percent of provincial gaming revenues in the late 1980s, have been reduced to 
approximately 1 percent in 201015. In light of these developments, it is interesting to 
estimate the revenues that the federal government would have received if the 1979 
agreement had been a different one. We examine five possible alternatives.  
 
  
                                                 
15
 These % were calculated by the authors using data from Roy and Vaillancourt for 1980 and from annual reports by 
provincial gaming body for 2010  
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Figure 1: Lottery and gaming payments by gaming authorities to provincial 
governments, 1969-2010, nominal $ 000 
 
Source: calculations by the authors using data from Roy and Vaillancourt (2000) and from gaming bodies 
__________________________________ 
1) The 7% solution – provincial payments to the federal government/provincial gaming 
revenues  
In 1980 – the first year of the federal/provincial lottery agreement – the payments to the 
federal government amounted to $26.5 million, which represented at the time 7% of the 
gaming revenues of provincial governments. This ratio has constantly decreased since then, 
reaching 1.02 % in 2010. If the agreement had provided that the federal government be 
paid a fixed percentage of the provincial gaming revenues, these payments to the Canadian 
government would have taken into account VLT and casino revenues when they were 
introduced in the 1990s. If we use the federal market share of 7% associated with the first 
direct payment in 1980, we find that federal government gaming revenues would have 
amounted to $464.9 million in 2010, compared to the actual amount of $66.6 million the 
federal received for the same year – i.e. revenues would have been 7 times higher.   
 
  
0 $ 
1,000,000 $ 
2,000,000 $ 
3,000,000 $ 
4,000,000 $ 
5,000,000 $ 
6,000,000 $ 
7,000,000 $ 
8,000,000 $ 
Gambling payments to 
provincial governments 
Lottery payments to provincial 
governments 
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2) The 25 % solution (large) – The 1978 federal share of the gaming market 
Even more striking are the simulation results if we assume that the agreement had 
provided that the federal government maintains its 1978 market share of the government 
gaming revenues (25%), then limited to lotteries. We calculate that the federal government 
would have received gaming revenues of $1,663.3 million in 2010.  
 
3-4) The 25 % solution (narrow) – The 1978 federal share of the lottery market 
Even if the federal government had agreed to a fixed percentage applicable strictly on 
provincial lottery revenues (i.e. excluding casino and VLT revenues), it would have received 
considerably higher payments than the effective ones. Indeed, in 2010, a 7 and a 25 percent 
share solely applicable to lottery revenues would have respectively yielded the federal 
government $158.3 and $566.3 million. 
 
5) The 14% solution – The 1979 federal share of ticket sales (net of costs)  
Another possibility is linking the provincial payments to the gross revenues associated with 
ticket sales. For instance, in 1979, Loto-Canada’s ticket sales amounted to $134.2 million, 
whereas the sum of the provincial sales was $839.9 million. That is, 14 percent of lottery 
tickets sales were sold by the federal lottery corporation. Had this percentage been applied 
to subsequent provincial ticket sales net of the costs of a lottery corporation16 to calculate 
federal payments, they would have amounted to $288 million in 2010.  
 
The results from these various simulations are found in figure 217 and appendix table A-3.  
 
  
                                                 
16
 We projected those costs by using the 1979 provincial net benefits/ticket sales ratio of 26 percent 
17
 Except the 25% ( large) results whose inclusion make the figure illegible  
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Figure 2: Effective federal lottery payments and simulated payments indexed to 1978 
and 1980 federal lottery market share, 1979 share of ticket sales less administrative 
costs and 1980 federal gaming market share, 1980-2010 $000 nominal terms 
 
 
Source: table A-3 
 
Thus, because of the considerable growth of the Canadian lottery and gaming markets since 
1980, the agreement of 1979 is not very generous to the federal government. At least five 
alternative formulas would have been more beneficial to the federal government; the 
formula that was actually used was incapable of taking into account either the future 
growth of the lottery market or the diversification of the gaming market in Canada from 
1980 to 2010, let alone both.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper presents an unusual feature of inter-governmental financial relations: a payment 
by constituent units of a federation to the federal government to keep it out of a fiscal field 
and thus gain sole occupancy for themselves. It reviews how this agreement came about 
and shows that the federal presence through Loto-Canada did reduce provincial gaming 
revenues from lotteries and thus supports the provinces’ objection to the federal 
0   
100,000   
200,000   
300,000   
400,000   
500,000   
600,000   
Federal lottery market share in 1978 
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1980 (7.1 %) 
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Federal lottery market share in 1980 
(7.1 %) 
Effective federal payments 
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government remaining an active player in the lottery market. This, given the payment 
formula agreed to, has turned out to be quite advantageous for the provinces. This 
agreement shows an original, and as far as we know, fairly unique way to settle the sharing 
of a tax field between different levels of government in a federation. It is in a sense a mirror 
image of the federal provincial Tax Rental Agreements of WWII when the federal 
government paid the provinces to obtain temporary sole occupancy of the income 
(corporate and individual) and succession tax fields. These agreements morphed into the 
current system of shared tax fields and equalization payments. This lottery agreement has 
remained frozen (in real $) in time.  
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Appendix 1 - Key features of the 1978 and 1979 federal provincial agreements on the 
gaming tax field 
 
1978 agreement 
 Pricing agreement: tickets costing $9 or < sold by the provincial lotteries, $10+ by the 
federal lottery. 
 Pay out by each lottery of no more than 50% of gross revenues and marketing expenses of 
no more than 4% of such revenues. 
 Lotteries with a price of $5+ must not have more than one draw per month. 
 Lotteries are those of a type similar to those currently operated. 
 Monetary limits to be reviewed every five years. 
 Revenue sharing to be envisaged: 12, 5% of federal revenues and 3% of provincial 
revenues could be used for projects of a national or international significance. 
 The federal, Ontario and Québec governments must reach a reasonable agreement on how 
to dispose of Loto Select. 
1979 agreement 
 Loto-Canada to be closed as soon as possible 
 Yearly payment by provinces amounting to $24 million from the provincial lottery 
corporations. These payments took the form of quarterly instalments of $6 million, 
beginning as of April 1st 1980, and were planned to increase according to inflation, using 
the Consumer Price Index as a measure.  Sharing between provinces to be decided by 
them. 
 Promised funding for hockey arenas renovations in Alberta, Manitoba and Québec now to 
be paid by these provinces while the Ontario Royal Museum will not receive federal 
funding. 
 Ontario and Québec will finalize payments linked to the dismantling of Loto Select. 
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Appendix 2 Regression results  
 
To estimate the effect of the presence of Loto-Canada on the provinces’ revenues, we use 
the following model:  
 
                                                                        
                                                                  
+              Dummies 
 
All continuous variables, namely Provincial Revenues, Ticket Sales, Unemployment, Income 
and Alternative Gaming are used in both level and first-difference form. LC1976 through 
LC1979 are dummy variables designating the presence of Loto-Canada in the lottery fiscal 
field during those four years. Income and Unemployment are respectively the average 
personal income and the annual unemployment rate. The inclusion of both the current and 
lagged value of unemployment allows the effect of that variable to take place over a longer 
period of time.  
 
The Provincial variables are dummies used to extract the provincial fixed effects. They refer 
to the Canadian lottery corporations, namely the Atlantic Lottery Corporation, Loto-Québec, 
the Western Lottery Corporation, and the Ontario Lottery Corporation. The model includes 
no constant term so all four provincial dummies are present. These fixed-effects variables 
are expected to capture the province-specific factors that may affect the dependent 
variables, such as cultural factors and attitudes towards gaming. For instance, Quebec is 
known to have a longer history of gaming. Another such factor is the composition of the 
population. Demographic variables such as age, sex and education have an impact on the 
purchase of lottery tickets (Roy and Vaillancourt, 2000).  
 
Data 
Our set of data goes from 1969 to 2010 and comes from five lottery corporations: the 
Atlantic Lottery Corporation (ALC), Loto-Québec (LQ), the Ontario Lottery and Gaming 
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Corporation (OLG), the Western Lottery Corporation (WLC) and the British Columbia 
Lottery Corporation (BCLC). Data from the WLC and BCLC were combined to form one data 
set (referred to in the results as WBC). Before 1985, the British Columbia lottery market 
was managed by the WLC. For uniformity purposes, we disregard the later split when 
British Columbia decided to create its own lottery corporation. We use those 147 panel 
observations in our regression.  
 
Provincial lottery net benefits, lottery ticket sales and provincial non-traditional lottery and 
gaming net benefits (henceforth referred to as alternative gaming) are found in Vaillancourt 
and Roy (2000); more recent numbers were collected directly from the annual reports of 
the five lottery corporations. Alternative gaming revenue of the WLC provinces was 
gathered from annual reports of those provinces’ gaming commissions; non-traditional 
lottery and other forms of gaming activity are administered independently in those 
provinces. These are the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority, the Manitoba 
Lotteries Corporation and the Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission. We used population 
data from Statistics Canada (CANSIM table 051-0005) to calculate the per capita net 
benefits of provincial lotteries and lottery ticket sales.  The average personal income data 
was also provided by Statistics Canada (CANSIM table 380-0050). We aggregated 
information from Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Prince Edward’s Island 
to form the ALC observations, and that from British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba for WBC observations.  
 
 
We estimated three equations for two dependent variables:  
1)  A level equation with logarithmic variables; 2) a first difference equation with the same 
variables and lastly 3) a first difference equation with a supplementary variable-lagged 
unemployment. 
 
The level equation displayed strong autocorrelation stemming from the non-stationarity of 
unemployment but we report it as it is the traditional estimation in this field of work; the 
very high coefficients of determination (over 0.99) strongly suggest a spurious regression.  
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Taking the first difference of our continuous variables implies that we investigate short-
term movements i.e. the impact of Loto-Canada on the annual growth of provincial 
revenues and ticket sales.  
 
Estimation results 
Interpretation will be limited to the coefficients from the final specification, first differences 
with the lagged value of unemployment. Estimates from the other specifications are 
presented in the table below but will not be discussed.  
 
The observations used in the final regression being first differences, the estimated 
coefficients represent the impact of the growth of right hand side variables on the short 
term variations of the dependent variables. We observe at first that the R-squared values 
demonstrate a relatively good fit on the regressions. For a first-difference regression, a 
value of 0.33 for net benefits and 0.35 for ticket sales suggest that the independent 
variables explain a significant portion of the observed variations in lottery profits and ticket 
sales. The model seems reasonably well suited to explain fluctuations in the lottery market. 
 
Unemployment exhibits an interesting impact on the lottery market. Whereas the lagged 
value does show the positive effect on net benefits and ticket sales that we predicted, a 
contemporaneous change in unemployment is observed to cause a decrease in those same 
measures. Our estimates predict that a rise of 1 percent in the unemployment rate in this 
period diminishes the growth of net benefits per capita by $1.75 and ticket sales by $2.90 
(respective averages are $41.85 and $144.11).  On the other hand, the same change in 
unemployment causes lottery benefits to rise by $0.98 and ticket sales by $3.10 in the next 
period. Changes in income per person, on the other hand, reveal neither statistically or 
economically significant estimates for the ticket sales regression. The coefficient on income 
for the net benefits regression is statistically significant at the 10% level. It shows that the 
growth of net benefits is reduced by $0.001 in the event of a rise of $1 in mean income per 
person. Alternative gaming revenues display the expected negative impact on the lottery 
market. As other forms of gaming (video lotteries, casinos, etc.) can be viewed as 
substitutes to lottery purchases, it is normal to expect a decrease in demand for traditional 
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lottery if other forms of gaming expand. We observe that a rise of $1 in alternative gaming 
revenues lowers the growth of net benefits by $0.17 and ticket sales by $0.20.  The 
intercepts represent the time-invariant differences that distinguish the lottery markets in 
different provinces, in other words the provincial fixed effects. It appears, however, that 
those fixed effects have little influence over the two dependent variables. The only 
intercepts whose equality can be rejected at the 10% threshold are those of LQ and WBC in 
the net benefits regression. Their prediction is that if all else remains constant, WBC net 
benefits will grow by an additional $2 each period compared to LQ net benefits. 
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Table A-1: OLS fixed-effect estimates of three different specifications on the 
dependent variables of Per Capita Provincial Lottery Net Benefits and Provincial 
Lottery Ticket Sales, 1969-2010. 
 
 
Provincial Gaming Revenues Ticket Sales 
Level 
Logarithmic 
specification 
First 
difference 
First difference 
w/  lagged 
unemployment 
Level 
Logarithmic 
specification 
First  
difference 
First difference 
w/ lagged 
unemployment 
Unemployment 
0.380** 
(-0.175) 
-1.441* 
(-0.391) 
-1.751* 
(-0.405) 
0.306** 
(0.139) 
-1.995** 
(0.983) 
-2.903* 
(1.005) 
Income 
2.078* 
(-0.234) 
-0.002** 
(-0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(-0.001) 
2.436* 
(0.185) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Alternative 
gaming 
0.039 
(-0.034) 
-0.178* 
(-0.041) 
-0.168* 
(-0.041) 
0.074* 
(0.027) 
-0.236** 
(0.102) 
-0.204** 
(0.1) 
lc1976 
-0.076 
(-0.229) 
-0.384 
(-3.147) 
-3.301 
(-4.398) 
-0.193 
(0.182) 
-1.120 
(7.917) 
-10.319 
(10.916) 
lc1977 
-0.131 
(-0.199) 
-0.481 
(-2.629) 
-1.376 
(-3.137) 
-0.082 
(0.158) 
-2.961 
(6.616) 
-5.025 
(7.786) 
lc1978 
-0.350*** 
(-0.197) 
-4.647** 
(-2.266) 
-5.814** 
(-2.615) 
-0.080 
(0.156) 
-7.296 
(5.701) 
-12.688*** 
(6.49) 
lc1979 
-0.456** 
(-0.196) 
-4.856** 
(-2.294) 
-5.513** 
(-2.292) 
-0.082 
(0.155) 
-7.121 
(5.773) 
-8.975 
(5.688) 
Time 
trend 
-0.044* 
(-0.016) 
-0.126* 
(-0.039) 
-0.133* 
(-0.039) 
-0.059* 
(0.013) 
-0.246** 
(0.097) 
-0.258* 
(0.097) 
ALC 
-17.174* 
(-1.906) 
5.728* 
(-1.208) 
5.484* 
(-1.233) 
-18.885* 
(1.51) 
14.402* 
(3.038) 
13.535* 
(3.06) 
LQ 
-16.750* 
(-1.926) 
5.193* 
(-1.069) 
5.193* 
(-1.113) 
-18.763* 
(1.526) 
10.831* 
(2.69) 
10.606* 
(2.763) 
OLG 
-17.121* 
(-1.985) 
6.015* 
(-1.223) 
5.783* 
(-1.253) 
-19.213* 
(1.573) 
12.911* 
(3.078) 
12.013* 
(3.109) 
WBC 
-17.241* 
(-1.983) 
7.458* 
(-1.3) 
7.182* 
(-1.335) 
-19.283* 
(1.571) 
13.942* 
(3.272) 
12.683* 
(3.312) 
Lagged 
unemployment 
 
0.980** 
(-0.393) 
 3.055* 
(0.975) 
R-squared 0.9902 0.3251 0.3516 0.9965 0.3460 0.3855 
Source: calculations by the authors 
* indicates significance at the 1% threshold 
** indicates significance at the 5% threshold 
*** indicates significance at the 10% threshold 
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Appendix 3 – Table of effective provincial payments and simulated payments under five 
scenarios, lottery market and gaming market, 1980-2010, nominal $000  
 
   
Traditional lottery 
market 
Overall gaming 
 market 
Year 
Effective 
Provincial  
payments 
14% 
solution 
7% 
solution 
25% 
solution 
7% 
solution 
25%  
solution 
1980 26515 41234 24617 88065 24617 88065 
1981 29592 44231 26634 95281 26634 95281 
1982 32457 50469 27137 97081 27137 97081 
1983 34124 63751 39547 141478 39547 141478 
1984 38359 77615 49554 177279 49554 177279 
1985 73321 96203 63631 227636 63631 227636 
1986 71753 123438 87201 311959 87201 311959 
1987 67062 127799 90646 324284 90646 324284 
1988 41656 136497 97553 348992 97553 348992 
1989 43869 139063 99854 357223 99854 357223 
1990 45972 145359 99548 356128 100643 360046 
1991 47944 153280 100802 360616 106421 380719 
1992 48736 168256 109105 390321 123580 442103 
1993 49423 181448 114343 409059 154453 552550 
1994 49604 187222 117513 420399 207136 741022 
1995 50720 198109 122923 439754 241085 862472 
1996 52223 198743 125041 447330 271500 971283 
1997 56158 207017 128501 459709 318731 1140249 
1998 52773 223747 127136 454823 324877 1162234 
1999 54002 231473 147734 528512 364106 1302576 
2000 55589 219202 131272 469622 399623 1429639 
2001 56786 219166 132161 445368 417487 1493546 
2002 58383 227907 135339 484170 431021 1541962 
2003 59571 228929 130431 466611 427485 1529312 
2004 60626 232134 135217 483734 448698 1605203 
2005 62349 239509 138450 495300 466663 1669472 
2006 63125 252312 139313 498386 475867 1702399 
2007 63772 258604 133911 479063 473155 1692696 
2008 65143 265240 139535 499180 474423 1697232 
2009 65330 258615 139971 500741 458935 1641825 
2010 66577 288983 158295 566294 464930 1663272 
 Source : calculations by the authors 
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